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We  present  a  new  refinement  for  signalling  games:  the  Introspective 
Equilibrium.  It  is  based  on  both  a  procedure  for  beliefs  formation  -called 
Incentive Dominance-  and a global consistence requirement,  closely  related  to 
that  of  the  Undefeated  equilibrium  of  mailath,  Okuno-Fujiwara  and 
Postlewaite.  The  incentive  Dominance  criterion  captures  the  principie  of 
forward  induction  through  explicitly  modelling  the  players  thought  process 
when  forming  preliminary  beliefs.  The  main  idea  is  that  they  should  exploit 
the  information  contained  in  the  best  reply  structure  about  the  incentives  of 
the  different  types  of  a  a  rational  Bayesian  sender.  Our  criterion  subsumes 
very  intuitive  ones  as  equilibrium  dorninance  and  divinity.  The  Introspective 
Equilibrium asks for an unambigous explanation of any deviation from a given 
equilibrium.  This  means  that  the  explanation  should  be  unique,  part  of  a 
sequential  equilibrium  and  achievable from the preliminary  beliefs defined  by 
the Incentive Dominance  Cnterion. 
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